Hyperloop system is a novel conceptual system aimed to provide a high speed public transportation service in the future, featured with a reduced-pressure tube in which pressurized capsules ride on a cushion of air that is driven by a combination of linear induction motors and air compressors. The project of developing Hyperloop is based on the crowdfunding-sourcing mode, which is dramatically different to the traditional way. Identifying the hazard of the Hyperloop system would be helpful to the publics' acceptance of the safety from the concept stage. If all the hazards were dealt properly, Hyperloop could be more realizable than ever. From system safety research's point, it is definitely a good opportunity to carry out different safety analysis and hazard identification methods to verify the effectiveness. With the predefined method of the model based HAZOP, a team work to identify the hazards of the Hyperloop system is carried out to verify the effectiveness.
I.
INTRODUCTION The Hyperloop system draws lots of attention from both the enthused supporters and the serious critics. The former group believe that the Hyperloop system could be a fifth form of public transportation alongside trains, planes, automobiles and boats. Currently, this conceptual system is at the very early stage of about ten years period of evolution predicted by the original inventor. However, the fantastic idea coupled with an attractive developing mode of crowdfunding-sourcing has attracted one hundred engineers from some traditional company such as Boeing, NASA and Airbus, to dedicate their own spare time to move the concept forward [1] .
The most interesting point is that the Hyperloop is a hot topic not only to the enthusiasts, but also to the critics. The most obvious criticism is about whether it will work technically. One of the hurdles is dealing with the temperature of air compression that the heat of compression is always underestimated by engineers [2]. There's also an economic risk. It is claimed that materializing the Hyperloop in California will cost $6 billion about one tenth as much as building a corresponding traditional high speed railway. Some emeritus scholars comment that a big issue is getting enough capital together to demonstrate and build untested technology [3] . From a design standpoint, another challenge is how to integrate Hyperloop stations into the urban environment so people can travel to and from them quickly without waiting before boarding and take off like they do at airports [4] .
In theory, it is commonly believed that the project, if it could be said, of building the Hyperloop system is full of risks, including management risks, economic risks, technical feasibility risks and legal risks etc. Actually, a public transportation service provider or equipment supplier should considerate the necessity of how well to deal with the safety risks no matter when the system is delivered. Additionally, the Hyperloop system should not just be demonstrated as a feasible solution but should be demonstrably safe to the public with an acceptable safety analysis. The highest uncertainty is how to find the crucial hazards systematically for the Hyperloop system and the related activities. Making sound hazard identification could help to setup the hazard log which is fundamental to making sound decisions on how to address priority hazards in the log. In practice, there are several kinds of hazard identification methods could be used in the different stages of a V life-cycle in different domain fields, including Preliminary Hazard Analysis, Subsystem Hazard Analysis, System Hazard Analysis, Operating and Support Hazard Analysis, Health Hazard Assessment, Fault Tree Analysis, Event Tree Analysis, Failure Mode and Effects Analysis, Fault Hazard Analysis, Functional Hazard Analysis, Sneak Circuit Analysis, Petri Net Analysis, Markov Analysis, Barrier Analysis, Hazard and Operability Analysis, Cause-Consequence Analysis, Common Cause Failure Analysis, Management Oversight Risk Tree Analysis, etc [5] .
Considering the issues in terms of the completeness and coverage of hazard identification, the work inherent in developing and assessing the hazard models from the informal specifications, the method named Model based HAZOP is selected to carry out the project of hazard identification for the Hyperloop system, after an effective and successful experience of using to identify the hazard for CTCS-3 (Chinese Train Control System level 3) funded by then MOR (Ministry of Railway) in China [9] .
Coinciding with the benefit of the hazard identification to the Hyperloop system, the open sourcing of this idiosyncratic obligation could give the safety related practitioners to check and improve the methods and make them more scientifically credible. Usually, the hazard log of a commercial or on service system is highly confidential, which could not be accessible freely. Moreover there is very little opportunity to make a sufficient argument and assessment. So it is very usual a safety analysis method to be easily and commonly critiqued as being credibly scientific [7] . The crowd-funding and open-sourcing development is more accessible than the traditional methods and believed to release more detailed design information to the public. Anyone interested with the topic could obtain the same material to make an examination between a pair of different hazard identification methods. Additionally a pair of researchers could make a crossexamination of a given method's effectiveness independent to individual factors.
For ease of specifying the Hyperloop system, the metanotations were defined explicitly prior to the project. A team accomplished the work packages of modelling the Hyperloop Alpha and identifying the hazards on schedule. With the one hundred forty three person-weeks, the outcome of thirty five models and one hundred twelve hazards identified is achieved. The effectiveness of the model based hazard identification for the Hyperloop system was verified successfully.
II. METHOD OF MODEL BASED HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
The selected method of model based HAZOP includes REM (Reference Model), STM (State transition Model), FHM (Functional hierarchical Model) and SEM (Sequence Model).
A. Modeling aspects
For the convenience of modelling train control system, several of notations are used. Principally, most of notations were created before. Some are common for each kind of model. Others are only used in a specific model.
1) REM
There are five notations that can be used in REM. First one is the boundary, shown as Fig.1 . The boundary is using to identify whether a component is belongs and an interface is connected from the outside to the system to be analysed. Then, the component looks like to rectangle, shown as The Component is representing a part combining the system. It can also be regarded as subsystem. For the convenience of defining the inter-model constraints later, the component is abbreviated as N-REM-COM. The interface is used to define a connection between a subsystem and somewhere outside the system, shown as Fig.3 . An interface could be single input, single output and dual-directive inputoutput. The note notation is very important and necessary to record the information of the author and some other critical awareness which can't be addressed anywhere.
2) STM STM is used to describe the system functions from the outside viewpoint, which are not offered by any of subsystem independently. There is a hierarchy of STMs for a given system. The surface level system functions can be grouped by several states in a STM. The start state notation is a filled cycle, shown as Fig.5 . The start state is default in a STM, and represents the initial state of the system which indicates that the system will provide some system functions after transiting from the start state. There should be an exclusive start state in a STM. Another default state is the end state, which is a filled circle inside a hollow circle, shown as Fig.6 . The end state represents the finishing of the system's work, which indicates that the system will not provide any more system functions. The next one is specific state notation, whose shape is like a round rectangle divided by a bar, shown as Fig.7 . It could be named by the modeler. To a specific state, it could be bundled with some system functions to show that these system functions can only be provided in the specific state, shown as Fig.8 . For the convenience of defining the inter-model constraints later, the system function bundled with a specific state is abbreviated by N-STM-STATE_NAME-SEMi, i can be any number from 1 to N. N means there are N system functions bundled with the specific state named STATE_NAME. There could be several specific states in a STM, except the start state and the end state. The transition notation is used to connect one state and another state or itself, shown as Fig.8 . The transition should connect two states. Its name can be specific by the modeler.
3) FHM To a given system, there could be several FHMs usually. FHM builds a function tree from top level to low level representing the construction of a subsystem's function, which can only be analyzed effectively in a detailed level as low as reasonably practicable. The component is the only top level notation in a FHM. The component represents a subsystem defined in the system's REM, shown as Fig.9 . For the convenience of defining the inter-model constraints later, the component is referenced by N-FHM-COMP_NAME. The detailed function notation represents a function nested in a component, shown as Fig.9 . A component can consist of more than one detailed function. A detailed function can also be realised by more than one detailed function.
For the convenience of defining the inter-model constraints later, the detailed function is abbreviated referenced by N-FHM-FUNC_NAME. A detailed function belonging to a component can be connected by a connector called the composite notation, shown as Fig.10 . A FHM tree could be build in any level as the analyzer needs.
4) SEM SEM is used to describe how the subsystems involved cooperate together to achieve a system function defined in the system's STM. Usually a system could have several SEMs. For the convenience of defining the inter-model constraints later, the SEM is referenced by N-SEM-SEM_NAME. The component notation is shaped like a rectangle, shown as Fig.11 . The second type is the data notation representing that the receiver uses the data to do some calculations, shown as Fig.13 . Besides the three kinds of exchange, a component conducting something is defined by the activity notation, which is shaped like a hollow bar represented vertically, shown as Fig.15 . For the convenience of defining the intermodel constraints lately, the activity is referenced by N-SEM-COMP_NAME-ACTIVITY. The activity notation represents that a component is conducting an activity, which is defined in the component's FHM. The destination or source component is represented by the delegate notation, which is like a dash line, shown as Fig.16 . 
5) Inter-models constraints
The multiple-model method has many advantages over the single model method. Firstly, the multiple-model can provide more useful representations of the system and information. Different experts have different perspectives about the system in their minds. Sometimes it is really difficult to reach agreement, because they are thinking from different viewpoints. It's not cost-effective to put too much effort into this kind of opinion based process. Secondly, the multiple-model can represent the system's static and dynamic characteristic. Some models can easily describe the static system, such as the structure. Others have the advantage of showing the dynamic interactions among the different subsystems. Thirdly, each model of the multiple-model method has fewer notations than a single sophisticated model, so that it could represent a system as explicitly and easily understanding as possible.
However the multiple-model has some drawbacks which must be overcome to make sure the model based HAZOP generates value. The key point is about the isolation. Each model of the multiple-model method is not necessarily accessible to others or can be readily comprehended. Without the necessary connections, a person can hardly visualise the system models comprehensively. Beside, the further point is that the isolated multiple-model suite creates a potential for possible conflict. Some contents in different independent models could be cause conflict that runs the risk of making the HAZOP nonsensical. Moreover, the multiple independent models are incomplete representation of the system by themselves and need to be considered in combination.
The proposed inter-model constraints include the rules connecting four pairs of models, REM versus FHM, STM versus SEM, REM versus SEM, FHM versus SEM, shown in Fig.17 . 
B. Models of the Hyperloop system
Totally, there are thirty five models being made for specifying the Hyperloop. The modeled Hyperloop system has nine subsystems, shown in Fig.18 .
According to model the STM, the system is bundled to twelve states, including Standby state, Air pressure Transfer state, Contact Operation state and Suspend Operation state, etc, shown in Fig.19 . 
C. Hazard identification
Once a multi-model representation of the system under study is produced, the hazard identification can be performed according to the process in Fig.22 .
• 1) From a model, selecting an element to be examined by HAZOP study • 2) Choosing one of nine guide words to be considered with the selected element • 3) Combining the guideword with the selected element to generate an abnormal scenario representing the deviation context according to the design intent • 4) Agreeing with the experts whether the abnormal scenario is a credible hazard. • 5) If it is regarded as a hazard, causes and consequences should be found and noted. Otherwise, the item is ignored. Then go to the step 2) to choose another guide word from unselected ones. Nevertheless, there is no guide word has yet been chosen.
• 6) For a given element, if all the guide words have been used, go to the step 1) to choose another element of the model.
If all the candidate of the elements has already been analyzed, end the process. There is some information to be logged for a recognized hazard, including the model name in the blank of reference, the unique identity number of hazard, the unique element identity number of an element, date, initial condition, hazard description, causes, consequences, guide words etc.
Totally, one hundred twelve hazards were identified and recorded in the hazard log. It is easy to trace a hazard from the log domain to the model domain. A sample of hazard scenario of "Stopping operation" is shown in Table I . 
III. MODELS AND HAZARDS OF THE HYPERLOOP SYSTEM
A team directed by a senior graduate student including twelve graduate students has undertaken the model based HAZOP for the Hyperloop system in part time mode. The task was scheduled to take ten weeks to accomplish the work regarding to the specification of Hyperloop Alpha [28] . The real time taken was about 10 percent more than the original plan.
There were five sessions held to discuss the issues related to modelling. For the hazard identification, the team made 35 models including one REM, one STM, nine FHMs and twenty four SEMs. The document of modelling is available at www.rstrc.org/jforum/posts/downloadAttach/2789.page in Chinese and English languages.
Another following nine sessions focused on HAZOP, and identified 112 hazards. The document is available at www.rstrc.org/jforum/posts/downloadAttach/2779.page.
IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
Identifying the hazard for the Hyperloop system is beneficial to both the engineers dedicated on the conceptual future transportation and the system safety professionals. An updated hazard log could make the Hyperloop system more open and trustworthy than ever and easy to be accepted by the public. A predefined method of model based HAZOP is proven effective to be used to identify the hazard of the Hyperloop system.
The crowd-funding-sourcing mode provides a new thinking to verify the effectiveness of the method of hazard identification. A web based benchmark is worth developing to make more and more open system critical system be more realized than ever. 
